Personally I'm for GMO labels and having a viable market for non-GMO foods - if only to ensure we have something to fall back on if someone screws up and makes a strain of something like corn that isn't viable in a manner that isn't apparant for many generations down the line. It would suck to suddenly have no corn crops 100 years from now because of a bunch of errors introduced in the modern time that couldn't be forseen but which were so viable in the short-term that people stopped breeding heirloom and otherwise "natural" strains completely in favor of GM versions. Paranoia does serve a legitimate evolutionary purpose in a large number of situations - it's almost always good to have a portion of the population that doesn't do things the same way as everyone else and if paranoia of GMO spurs that it is worth keeping.
On Wednesday, January 28, 2015 at 2:07:49 PM UTC-5, Jonathan Cline wrote:
-- On Wednesday, January 28, 2015 at 2:07:49 PM UTC-5, Jonathan Cline wrote:
The world will end or the world will triumph detailed in several dozen ways with graphical analysis according to the World Economic Forum's 2015 Global Risks report, and this will include synbio.
The WEF report, which is either read by, or misquoted to, everyone with a suit, states: "Some of these risks could be existential – that is, endangering the future of human life (see [sidebar on synbio and DIYbio])" . Pandemic outbreak or Rapid and massive spread of infectious disease is ranked very near the top as major a risk to humanity, though personally I would rank intentional fraud within the global food supply as more likely (aka, "the melamine problem" or the "arsenic exists in U.S. rice yet we as the FDA are sweeping it under the rug" problem); I would rather eat a GMO.
By the way, be sure to read the latest issue of BioCoder for more existential angst, it's hot off the press.
Anyway here's the WEF abstract, quote:
The Global Risks report 2015
http://www.weforum.org/reports/global-risks-report- 2015
""The 2015 edition of the Global Risks report completes a decade of highlighting the most significant long-term risks worldwide, drawing on the perspectives of experts and global decision-makers.
Over that time, analysis has moved from risk identification to thinking through risk interconnections and the potentially cascading effects that result.
Taking this effort one step further, this year's report underscores potential causes as well as solutions to global risks.
Not only do we set out a view on 28 global risks in the report's traditional categories (economic, environmental, societal, geopolitical and technological) but also we consider the drivers of those risks in the form of 13 trends.
In addition, we have selected initiatives for addressing significant challenges, which we hope will inspire collaboration among business, government and civil society communities.""
Here is the sidebar quoted in full (they have a great list of references), which journalists won't read correctly and will subsequently misinterpret for misleading articles to be published in AP faux-science news reports and faux-intellectual rags like Wired:
Quote (sorry for the unicode funny characters):
Box 2.6: Synthetic biology - protecting mother natureEnd quote.
"""For thousands of years, humans have been selectively breeding crops and
animals. With the discovery of DNA hybridization in the early 1970s, it became
possible to genetically modify existing organisms. Synthetic biology goes
further: it refers to the creation of entirely new living organisms from
standardized building blocks of DNA. The technology has been in development
since the early 2000s, as knowledge and methods for reading, editing and
designing genetics have improved, costs of DNA sequencing and synthesis have
decreased, and computer modelling of proposed designs has become more
sophisticated. (see Figure 2.6.1)
In 2010 Craig Venter and his team demonstrated that a simple bacterium could be
run on entirely artificially-made DNA.1 Applications of synthetic biology that
are currently being developed include producing biofuel from E. coli bacteria;
designer organisms that act as sensors for pollutants or explosives;
optogenetics, in which nerve cells are made light-sensitive and neural signals
are controlled using lasers, potentially revolutionizing the treatment of
neurological disorders; 3D-printed viruses that can attack cancer;2 and gene
drives as a possible solution to insect-borne diseases (as discussed in Box
2.7).
Alongside these vast potential benefits are a range of risks. Yeast has already
been used to make morphine;3 it is not hard to imagine that synthetic biology
may allow entirely new pathways for producing illicit drugs. The invention of
cheap, synthetic alternatives to high-value agricultural exports such as
vetiver could suddenly destabilize vulnerable economies by removing a source of
income on which farmers rely.4 As technology to read DNA becomes more
affordable and widely available, privacy concerns are raised by the possibility
that someone stealing a strand of hair or other genetic material could glean
medicallysensitive information or determine paternity.
The risk that most concerns analysts, however, is the possibility of a
synthetized organism causing harm in nature, whether by error or terror. Living
organisms are self-replicating and can be robust and invasive. The terror
possibility is especially pertinent because synthetic biology is 'small tech' --
it does not require large, expensive facilities or easily-tracked resources.
Much of its power comes from sharing information and, once a sequence has been
published online, it is nearly impossible to stop it: a 'DIYbio' or 'biohacker'
community exists, sharing inventions in synthetic biology, while the
International Genetically Engineered Machines competition is a large
international student competition in designing organisms, with a commitment to
open-sourcing the biological inventions.
Conceivably, a single rogue individual might one day be able to devise a weapon
of mass destruction ; a virus as deadly as Ebola and as contagious as flu. What
mechanisms could safeguard against such a possibility? Synthetic biology and
affordable DNA-sequencing also opens up the possibility of designing bespoke
viruses as murder weapons: imagine a virus that spreads by causing flu-like
symptoms and is programmed to cause fatal brain damage if it encounters a
particular stretch of DNA found only in one individual.5
Synthetic biology is currently governed largely as just another form of genetic
engineering. Regulations tend to assume large institutional stakeholders such
as industries and universities, not small and medium-sized enterprises or
amateurs. The governance gap is illustrated by the controversy surrounding the
very successful 2013 crowdsourcing of bioluminescent plants, which exploited a
legal loophole dependent on the method used to insert genes.6 The Glowing
Plants project, which aims ultimately to make trees function as street lights,
was able to promise to distribute 600,000 seeds without any oversight by a
regulatory body other than the discretion of Kickstarter. The project caused
concern not only among activists against genetically modified organisms, but
also among synthetic biology enthusiasts who feared it might cause a backlash
against the technology.7
Differences can already be observed in the focus of DIYbio groups in Europe and
the United States due to the differing nature of regulations on
genetically-modified organisms in their regions, with European enthusiasts
focusing more on 'bio-art'.8 The amateur synthetic biology community is very
aware of safety issues and pursuing bottom-up options for self-regulation in
various ways, such as developing voluntary codes of practice.9 However,
self-regulation has been criticized as inadequate, including by a coalition of
civil society groups campaigning for strong oversight mechanisms.10 Such
mechanisms would need to account for the cross-border nature of the technology,
and inherent uncertainty over its future direction.11
Notes:
1 Gibson, D. et al., 2010. ¿Creation of a bacterial cell controlled by a chemically synthesized genome¿. Science 329 (5987): 52¿6
2 See 3dprint.com article ¿Autodesk Genetic Engineer is Able to 3D Print Viruses, Soon to Attack Cancer Cells¿; http://3dprint.com/19594/3d-printed-virus-fightscancer/ .
3 See Scientific American article ¿Yeast Coaxed to Make Morphine¿; http://www.scientificamerican.com/podcast/episode/yeast- .coaxed-to-make-morphine/
4 See Inter Press Service News Agency article ¿Synthetic Biology Could Open a Whole New Can of Worms¿; http://www.ipsnews.net/2014/10/synthetic-biology- .couldopen-a-whole-new-can-of- worms/
5 See The Atlantic article ¿Hacking the President¿s DNA¿; http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/11/ .hacking-the-presidents-dna/ 309147/
6 See A. Evans¿ article ¿Glowing Plants: Natural Lighting with no Electricity¿; https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/antonyevans/glowing- , and Scientific American article ¿Glowing Plants: Crowdsourced Genetic Engineering Project Ignites Controversy¿; http://www.scientificamerican.plants-natural-lighting-with- noelectricit com/article/glowing-plants- .controversy-questions-and- answers/
7 See Crowdfund Insider¿s article ¿Kickstarter Bans GMOs In Wake Of Glowing Plant Campaign¿; http://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2013/08/20031-kickstarter- .bansgmos-in-wake-of-glowing- plant-fiasco/
8 See NCBI literature ¿European do-it-yourself (DIY) biology: Beyond the hope, hype and horror¿; http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4158858/ .
9 See for example BioScience article ¿Biosafety Considerations of Synthetic Biology in the International Genetically Engineered Machine (iGEM) Competition¿; http://www.biofaction.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/igem- ; ¿A Biopunk Manifesto¿; https://maradydd.livejournal.biosafety-2013.pdf com/496085.html ; and DIYbio Codes;
http://diybio.org/codes/.
10 See ¿The Principles for the Oversight of Synthetic Biology¿; http://www.biosafety-info.net/file_dir/ .15148916274f6071c0e12ea.pdf
11 Zhang, J.Y. et al., 2011.
"""
Let's also not forget the disappearance of (or lack of emergence of) intellectual property rights in the modern digital world. Many of those shouting "open source!" are actually attempting theft behind the curtain. Large, supposedly non-evil corporations are not doing any better (ahem: Google, Youtube). So I'll quote the copyright of the above report here, to either take seriously or shrug the shoulders.
World Economic Forum
Geneva
World Economic Forum®
© 2015 – All rights reserved.
"No part of this publication may be reproduced or
Transmitted in any form or by any means,
including Photocopying and recording, or by any
information Storage and retrieval system."
And now, a word from Chuck Norris, the only human strong enough to survive amidst an apocalyptic biogenesis event:
Is Your Food Being 'Poisoned'?
http://townhall.com/columnists/chucknorris/2013/ 06/11/is-your-food-being- poisoned-n1616802/page/full
""Last week, I discussed the dangers of genetic engineering to crop seeds and other foods. As a response, one of the readers of "C-Force," my weekly health and fitness column, asked, "What do you think are the best ways to avoid GMOs when they aren't even labeled on food ingredients?"
Let me tell you how I responded.
First, contact your governmental officials, and ask them to endorse or support legislation that requires food companies to start listing whether their products use GMOs.""
Hey Chuck Norris, how about going ninja on the FDA for a way to measure how much mercury is in the sushi we're eating, for those of us without titanium blood? Might be nice.
-- ## Jonathan Cline ## jcl...@ieee.org ## Mobile: +1-805-617-0223 ########################
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