Re: [DIYbio] Biosecurity

rDNA stands for recombinant DNA. A more modern term would be synthetic nucleic acid (SNA), which covers more than just ligated DNA. The NIH distinguishes between SNAs that are copies/complements of natural DNA and SNAs that are not. My concern lies with the latter, mainly because the scientific community has moved on from their initial discussions that ended with a strategy to contain these nucleic acids in labs. The conversation may have faded but the risk is increasing.

We should worry about gene combinations we know are dangerous. Many advocate for this monitoring and I agree. The point I am trying to make is that we don't know enough to assume no novel genes or gene combinations will ever occur. Yes, nature could do this and so biotechnology might give us the tools to understand and defend ourselves from natural disasters. Bioterrorism is another issue. I'm not talking about either. I'm talking about unintended consequences. Because it seems like an existential threat is no reason to ignore it.

I'm glad you found Mr. Kozubek's article. I spoke with him after I read his book. The proposal to transplant containment off-planet is radical and I find it stifles the conversation, despite it making the point that containment is important - really important . Yes, it potentially creates a 'perfect is the enemy of good' situation.

Don't assume bleach or sterilization techniques destroy every single nucleic acid in a lab. We should assume some of these molecules are leaking into the environment via multiple vectors like accidental spills, malfunctioning autoclaves, and neglect.

I did not say human sequences might affect the environment. I did suggest human-created (engineered) sequences could affect the environment. I will not spell out specific mechanisms on the internet, and so I understand I might not be able to convince people through this medium that what they are doing by creating SNAs that are novel is potentially dangerous. The analogy that I use is the Megabucks lottery. The chances any one new SNA will lead to a catastrophe is almost zero, but someone wins the lottery almost every week. The risk is not in any one molecule. The risk of something really bad happening increases as we make more SNAs. The risk also increases with time new sequences have to evolve.

The majority of molecular biologists who first considered risks associated with creating recombinant DNA said they had concerns novel viral or pathogenic materials might be created inadvertently and so they sounded the alarm. That should give us all pause, especially if we are the ones making the stuff.

https://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/ps/access/CDBBCF.pdf

So, my message is please be careful and at the very least meet BSL1 standards and follow the NIH Guidelines on rDNA research.

If you don't comprehend what I am saying here, perhaps you should consider giving up your hobby.


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