Re: Seeing Risk, U.S. Asks Journals to Cut Flu Study Facts

Cathal is utterly correct here. Taking a broader stance, I would state
that through the development of computer science in the last 30 years,
and the opening up of access to said science, we have found again and
again that security through obscurity, meaning security by keeping
things that are insecure or dangerous secret, has failed miserably,
and probably led to the large outbreaks of computer viruses in the
1990s and early 2000s. Also, it seems to me that this is a shining
example of why I distrust the NIH and other such government bodies
that sponsor scientific inquiry. The answer to this question isn't the
sealing of files and the prevention of discourse, but a renewed
exploration of virus vectors and ways that you could protect an
ecological system from such a "super virus". This is why my greatest
hope for biological, and any, inquiry is an open and public discourse
unfettered by reactionary politics. Over all, shame on the NIH and
especially this ethical review board for thinking that this is
anything resembling a proper response.

Jonathan Nesser
diybioandneurosci.blogspot.com

On Dec 21, 4:08 pm, Cathal Garvey <cathalgar...@gmail.com> wrote:
> It's a pointless and damaging gesture; the study authors confirmed
> earlier statements on their work, which confirmed how easy it is. They
> simply serially-infected ferrets with the infectious-but-not-contagious
> wild virus, and after a mere 10 generations it became airborne.
>
> It's actually easier to make the virus in this way, I imagine, than by
> engineering or synthesising it based on their experimental results. By
> censoring the results, they are harming our ability as a global society
> to prepare for the worst, while doing utterly nothing to prevent the
> potential for an outbreak or attack.
>
> Typical, eh?
>
> On 21/12/11 16:54, Nathan McCorkle wrote:
>
>
>
> > On Wed, Dec 21, 2011 at 10:38 AM, Jeswin <phillyj...@gmail.com> wrote:
> >> I was going to post this. I heard it this morning on the BBC. The US
> >> asked that the researcher not post specific details about the sequence
> >> they discovered that permits the transfer of the virus from ferret to
> >> ferret. They used the ferrets in the studies. The Principle
> >> Investigator said that the sequence is important for testing
> >> laboratories and specifically selecting who to send this sequence info
> >> to is cost-prohibitive. Also, it will require countries to come
> >> together and sign an agreement saying this data must be kept secret.
> >> Given that world talks like the recent one in Durban mostly failed to
> >> agree to a binding treaty, I assume the same will happen.
>
> >> The PI and and persons supporting the censorship both agreed that the
> >> protocol is common knowledge. I don't know if a "terrorist" could
> >> replicate the mutation without some expensive sequencing machines.
> >> Since mutations are random, the probability they replicate the
> >> mutation in an organism is hit or miss. Am I right? If a foreign state
>
> > Yeah I think you're right, selectively breeding the virus, only
> > allowing ferrets to contact each other through air exchange or
> > something.
>
> >> wanted to create an H1N1 bio-weapon, it can be done. If an individual
> >> or a terrorist group wanted to, I would say the success rate is
> >> extremely unlikely.
>
> > I think the only restriction to anyone successfully replicating this
> > work is A) smart enough with basic biotech, and B) having Personal
> > Protective Equipment (PPE) so the researchers don't kill themselves. I
> > think the latter is where terrorists would get stopped, carelessness,
> > or pressure from their terrorizing authorities to get work done faster
> > seems like it would lead to quick failure
>
> >> This sets a new precedence into the restriction/censorship of
> >> scientific knowledge. Saying that the public does not need to know
> >> technical information, information that is not proprietary or
> >> extremely dangerous, dumbs down society to a bunch of hamsters in a
> >> cage.
>
> >> On Wed, Dec 21, 2011 at 10:11 AM, Bryan Bishop <kanz...@gmail.com> wrote:
> >>> (Including a cheap shot at amateurs "otherwise known as terrorists")
>
> >>> From: Eugen Leitl <eu...@leitl.org>
> >>> Date: Wed, Dec 21, 2011 at 5:26 AM
> >>> Subject: [biomed] Seeing Terror Risk, U.S. Asks Journals to Cut Flu Study
> >>> Facts
> >>> To: t...@postbiota.org, bio...@postbiota.org, cypherpu...@al-qaeda.net
>
> >>>http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/21/health/fearing-terrorism-us-asks-jo...
>
> >>> Seeing Terror Risk, U.S. Asks Journals to Cut Flu Study Facts
>
> >>> By DENISE GRADY and WILLIAM J. BROAD
>
> >>> Published: December 20, 2011
>
> >>> For the first time ever, a government advisory board is asking scientific
> >>> journals not to publish details of certain biomedical experiments, for fear
> >>> that the information could be used by terrorists to create deadly viruses
> >>> and
> >>> touch off epidemics.
>
> >>> National Institute for Biological Standards and Control/Photo Researchers
>
> >>> The A(H5N1) virus largely affects birds and rarely infects people, but it is
> >>> highly deadly when it does.
>
> >>> Kin Cheung/Associated Press
>
> >>> Health workers in Hong Kong killed chickens at a poultry market in 2008.
>
> >>> In the experiments, conducted in the United States and the Netherlands,
> >>> scientists created a highly transmissible form of a deadly flu virus that
> >>> does not normally spread from person to person. It was an ominous step,
> >>> because easy transmission can lead the virus to spread all over the world.
> >>> The work was done in ferrets, which are considered a good model for
> >>> predicting what flu viruses will do in people.
>
> >>> The virus, A(H5N1), causes bird flu, which rarely infects people but has an
> >>> extraordinarily high death rate when it does. Since the virus was first
> >>> detected in 1997, about 600 people have contracted it, and more than half
> >>> have died. Nearly all have caught it from birds, and most cases have been in
> >>> Asia. Scientists have watched the virus, worrying that if it developed the
> >>> ability to spread easily from person to person, it could create one of the
> >>> deadliest pandemics ever.
>
> >>> A government advisory panel, the National Science Advisory Board for
> >>> Biosecurity, overseen by the National Institutes of Health, has asked two
> >>> journals, Science and Nature, to keep certain details out of reports that
> >>> they intend to publish on the research. The panel said conclusions should be
> >>> published, but not experimental details and mutation data that would enable
> >>> replication of the experiments.
>
> >>> The panel cannot force the journals to censor their articles, but the editor
> >>> of Science, Bruce Alberts, said the journal was taking the recommendations
> >>> seriously and would probably withhold some information but only if the
> >>> government creates a system to provide the missing information to legitimate
> >>> scientists worldwide who need it.
>
> >>> The journals, the panel, researchers and government officials have been
> >>> grappling with the findings for several months. The Dutch researchers
> >>> presented their work at a virology conference in Malta in September.
>
> >>> Scientists and journal editors are generally adamant about protecting the
> >>> free flow of ideas and information, and ready to fight anything that hints
> >>> at
> >>> censorship.
>
> >>> I wouldn t call this censorship, Dr. Alberts said. This is trying to
> >>> avoid
> >>> inappropriate censorship. It s the scientific community trying to step out
> >>> front and be responsible.
>
> >>> He said there was legitimate cause for the concern about the researchers
> >>> techniques falling into the wrong hands.
>
> >>> This finding shows it s much easier to evolve this virus to an extremely
> >>> dangerous state where it can be transmitted in aerosols than anybody had
> >>> recognized, he said. Transmission by aerosols means the virus can be spread
> >>> through the air via coughing or sneezing.
>
> >>> Ever since the tightening of security after the terrorist attacks on Sept.
> >>> 11, 2001, scientists have worried that a scientific development would pit
> >>> the
> >>> need for safety against the need to share information. Now, it seems, that
> >>> day has come.
>
> >>> It s a precedent-setting moment, and we need to be careful about the
> >>> precedent we set, Dr. Alberts said.
>
> >>> Both studies of the virus one at the Erasmus Medical Center in Rotterdam,
> >>> in the Netherlands, and the other at the University of Wisconsin-Madison
> >>> were paid for by the National Institutes of Health. The idea behind the
> >>> research was to try to find out what genetic changes might make the virus
> >>> easier to transmit. That way, scientists would know how to identify changes
> >>> in the naturally occurring virus that might be warning signals that it was
> >>> developing pandemic potential. It was also hoped that the research might
> >>> lead
> >>> to better treatments.
>
> >>> Dr. Anthony Fauci, head of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious
> >>> Diseases, said the research addressed important public health questions, but
> >>> added, I m sure there will be some people who say these experiments never
> >>> should have been done.
>
> >>> Dr. Fauci said staff members at the institutes followed the results of the
> >>> research and flagged it as something that the biosecurity panel should
> >>> evaluate.
>
> >>> The lead researcher at the Erasmus center, Ron Fouchier, did not respond to
> >>> requests for an interview. The center issued a statement saying that
> >>> researchers there had reservations about the panel s recommendation, but
> >>> would observe it.
>
> >>> The Wisconsin researcher, Yoshihiro Kawaoka, was out of the country and not
> >>> responding to queries, according to a spokesman for the university. But the
> >>> school said its researchers would respect the panel s recommendations.
>
> >>> David R. Franz, a biologist who formerly headed the Army defensive
> >>> biological
> >>> lab at Fort Detrick, Md., is on the board and said its decision to
> >>> intervene,
> >>> made in the fall, was quite reasonable.
>
> >>> My concern is that we don t give amateurs or terrorists information
> >>> that
> >>> might let them do something that could really cause a lot a harm, he said
> >>> in
> >>> an interview.
>
> >>> It s a wake-up call, Dr. Franz added. We need to make sure that our best
> >>> and most responsible scientists have the information they need to prepare us
> >>> for whatever we might face.
>
> >>> Amy Patterson, director of the office of biotechnology activities at the
> >>> National Institutes of Health, in Bethesda, Md., said the recommendations
> >>> were a first.
>
> >>> The board in the past has reviewed manuscripts but never before concluded
> >>> that communications should be restricted in any way, she said in a
> >>> telephone
> >>> interview. These two bodies of work stress the importance of public health
> >>> preparedness to monitor this virus.
>
> >>> Ronald M. Atlas, a microbiologist at the University of Louisville and past
> >>> president of the
>
> ...
>
> read more »

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